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TEACHING A MAN TO FISH: WHY NATIONAL 
LEGISLATION ANCHORED IN NOTICE AND 
CONSENT PROVISIONS IS THE MOST EFFECTIVE 
SOLUTION TO THE SPYWARE PROBLEM 
 
M. Angela Buenaventura* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
[1] The term “spyware” encompasses a wide range of software designed to 
intercept or take partial control of a computer.  Spyware slows down 
computers and forces computer users to expend resources on repair and 
installation of protective software.1  Consumers also face the danger that 
personal information gathered through spyware will be misused.  Thus, 
most people agree that spyware is an annoying and costly problem.2  
However, there is no consensus on the best way to solve the spyware 
problem.  This article examines the methods currently being used to battle 
spyware, as well as proposed national spyware legislation.  The article 
outlines the various weaknesses in these methods of combating the 
problem, and suggests how these weaknesses can be remedied.   
 
[2] Part II of this paper will argue that state spyware legislation is 
inadequate to solve the spyware problem because of Dormant Commerce 
Clause issues and regulations that vary from state to state which lead to 
significant business planning and litigation costs.  Part III will explore 
other methods used by plaintiffs to battle spyware: the Wiretap Act, the 
                                                 
* Associate Bryan Cave LLP; JD., Northwestern University School of Law, 2006.  The 
author would like to express her gratitude to Steven Wernikoff, Andrea Matwyshyn, and 
Peter Neumer for their valuable insights and guidance. 
 
1 Federal Trade Commission Notices, Public Workshop: Monitoring Software On Your 
PC: Spyware, Adware, and Other Software, 69 Fed. Reg. 8538 (Feb. 24, 2004). 
2 Jane K. Winn, Contracting Spyware by Contract, 20 BERKLEY TECH. L.J. 1345, 1348 
(2005).  
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Stored Communications Act, the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, and the 
common law claim of trespass to chattels.  It will argue that, because 
courts so liberally construe “consent” in the e-commerce realm, the 
Wiretap Act and the Stored Communications Act are weak weapons 
against spyware.  In addition, this manuscript argues that the Computer 
Fraud and Abuse Act and the common law claim of trespass to chattels 
cannot adequately address the problem because these laws are merely 
after-the-fact solutions which do not prevent damage to computers in the 
first place.  Part IV argues that national spyware legislation with detailed 
notice and consent requirements is necessary to address the spyware 
problem.  Part V explores currently pending spyware legislation: the SPY 
ACT,3 I-SPY,4 and SPY BLOCK.5  This section will focus on the notice 
and consent provisions included in the legislation.  The final part will 
address the weaknesses in the notice and consent provisions of the 
proposed acts and suggest how these acts can be tweaked to remedy their 
shortcomings. 
II. WHY NATIONAL LEGISLATION IS NECESSARY 
A. STATE BILLS 
 
[3] Currently, the only legislation that specifically addresses spyware 
exists at the state level.  As of May 8, 2005 at least twenty-seven states 
were considering or had passed spyware legislation.6  These state bills can 
be grouped into three loose categories: “bad acts bills,” “notice bills,” and 
“trademark bills.”7   
 
 
 
                                                 
3 Securely Protect Yourself Against Cyber Trespass Act, H.R. 29, 109th Cong. (2005) 
[hereinafter SPY ACT].  
4 Internet Spyware Prevention Act of 2005, H.R. 744, 109th Cong. (2005) [hereinafter I-
SPY].  
5 Software Principles Yielding Better Levels of Consumer Knowledge Act, S. 2145, 
109th Cong. (2005) [hereinafter SPY BLOCK]. 
6 Susan P. Crawford, First Do No Harm: The Problem of Spyware, 20 BERKELEY TECH. 
L.J. 1433, 1436 (Summer 2005). 
7 Id. at 1437. 
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1. BAD ACTS BILLS 
 
[4] Alabama, Arkansas, Arizona, California, Illinois, Maryland, Michigan, 
Nebraska, New York, Rhode Island, Virginia, and Washington have 
passed or are considering “bad acts bills.”8   Bad acts bills prohibit a 
laundry list of software that performs certain unsavory functions such as 
changing homepages, bookmarks, or modem, or other Internet access 
settings.9  Such bills also prohibit software that transmits unauthorized e-
mail messages, using the computer as part of a distributed denial of 
service attack, or "opening multiple, sequential, stand alone 
advertisements"10 in a browser that cannot be closed without closing the 
browser or turning off the computer.11  In addition, software which 
collects personally identifiable information through deceptive means is 
illegal.12   
 
[5] Moreover, bad acts bills protect anti-spyware software such as Spybot 
by prohibiting deceptive prevention of a user's efforts to block software 
installations, misrepresentations that software will be uninstalled or 
disabled by what the user does next, and deceptive actions to disable anti-
spyware software.13  
2. NOTICE BILLS 
 
[6] Michigan, Pennsylvania, Oregon, Tennessee, and Texas have passed or 
are considering “notice bills.”14  Notice bills prohibit “spyware,” defined 
                                                 
8 Id. at 1441 n. 26 (citing S.B. 122, 2005 Leg. (Ala. 2005); S.B. 2904, 2005 Leg., Reg. 
Sess. (Ark. 2005); H.B. 2414, 47th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2005); Cal. Bus. & Prof. 
Code § 22947 (West Supp. 2006); H.B. 380, 94th Gen. Ass. (Ill. 2005); H.B. 945, 2005 
Leg., Reg. Sess. (Md. 2005); S.B. 151, 2005 Leg. (Mich. 2005); L.B. 316, 99th Leg., 1st 
Sess. (Neb. 2005); A.B. 549, 2005-2006 Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2005); H. 6211, Gen. Ass., Jan. 
Sess. (R.I. 2005); H.B. 2215, 2005 Leg., Gen. Ass. (Va. 2005); H.B. 1012, 59th Leg., 
2005 Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2005)). See generally National Conference of State Legislatures, 
2005 State Legislation Relating to Internet Spyware or Adware, 
http://www.ncsl.org/programs/lis/spyware05.htm (last visited Dec. 10, 2005). 
9 Id. at 1441. 
10 CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 22947 (West Supp. 2006).  
11 Crawford, supra note 6, at 1441. 
12 Id. 
13 Id. 
14 Id. at 1442-1443. 
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broadly within the bills,15 unless a consumer is given the name and contact 
information of the person installing the software, notice of intent to install 
the software, a full license agreement, and a means by which to refuse the 
installation and avoid further contact.16 
3. TRADEMARK BILLS 
 
[7] Alaska, Indiana, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Tennessee, and Utah 
have passed or are considering “trademark bills,” which address software 
that triggers unauthorized advertisements.17  For example, 1-800 Contacts, 
a Utah-based company, urged the state legislature to pass a spyware bill 
after it discovered that a company called SaveNow was installing software 
on consumers’ computers which caused a directory of search terms and 
URLs to be saved on the users’ desktop, then generated pop-up ads and 
coupons based on the saved data.18  1-800 Contacts was angry that a 
competitor’s ads were being triggered by the software to appear in 
windows over the 1-800 Contacts site.19  In order to be legal under 
trademark bills, software triggering ads must clearly identify the entity 
responsible for the ad and cannot be prompted by an unauthorized 
trademark use.20  The consent requirement of these bills also calls for a 
“full, detailed, plain language license agreement.”21 
                                                 
15 Id. For example, Pennsylvania spyware legislation, H.B. 574, § 2 (Penn. 2005) 
(introduced Feb. 16, 2005), defines spyware as follows: 
An executable computer program that automatically and without the control of a 
computer user gathers and transmits to the provider of the program or to a third 
party either of the following types of information: 
(1) Personal information or data of a user. 
(2) Data regarding computer usage, including, but not limited to, which Internet 
sites are, or have been, visited . . . . 
16 Crawford, supra note 6, at 1443. 
17 Id. at 1441-42,1442 n.28 (citing  S.B. 140, 24th Leg. (Alaska 2005); H.B. 1714, 2005 
Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2005); S.B. 273, 184th Gen. Ct. (Mass. 2005); H.B. 47 (N.H. 2005); H.B. 
1742, 104th Gen. Ass. (Tenn. 2005)).   
18 Id. at 1438, citing 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. WhenU.com, Inc., 309 F. Supp. 2d 467 
(S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
19 1-800 Contacts, Inc., 309 F. Supp. at 472. 
20 Crawford, supra note 6, at 1442 n. 28. 
21 Id at 1442. 
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B. PROBLEMS WITH STATE BILLS 
 
[8] Because regulating the Internet at the state level conflicts with the 
cross-boundary nature of the Internet, national legislation is necessary.  
The main problem with state bills is that although these bills target 
spyware loaded onto computers in the home state, the transmissions 
involved in installation comes from out of the state, and, in order to avoid 
liability, out-of-state businesses must conform to standards set by the most 
restrictive states.22  Thus, these bills have the unfortunate consequence of 
allowing one state to dictate spyware policy for the whole country.   
 
[9] Along with being a policy concern, the fact that a single state can 
regulate spyware nationwide also triggers Dormant Commerce Clause 
issues, meaning that these bills will most likely be found 
unconstitutional.23  In addition, regulations that vary from state to state 
lead to significant business planning costs as well as needless litigation of 
uncertain causes of action.24  Therefore, spyware must be combated at the 
national level. 
III. WHY OTHER LAWS ARE INSUFFICIENT TO COPE WITH THE SPYWARE 
PROBLEM 
 
[10] State spyware legislation is not the only tool currently being used to 
combat spyware: spyware can also be challenged under the Wiretap Act, 
the Stored Communications Act, the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, and 
the common law claim of trespass to chattels.   
A. THE WIRETAP ACT AND THE STORED COMMUNICATIONS ACT 
 
[11] Section 2511(1)(a) of the Wiretap Act prohibits any person from 
"intentionally intercepting . . . any wire, oral, or electronic 
communication."25  The term "intercept" is defined as "the aural or other 
                                                 
22 Peter S. Menell, Regulating “Spyware”: The Limitations of State "Laboratories" and 
the Case for Federal Preemption of State Unfair Competition Laws, 20 BERKELEY TECH. 
L.J. 1363, 1375-76 (Summer 2005). 
23 Crawford, supra note 6, at 1443-44. 
24 Menell, supra note 22, at 1412. 
25 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(a) (2000). 
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acquisition of the contents of any wire, electronic, or oral communication 
through the use of any electronic, mechanical, or other device."26  One can 
argue that URLs convey the meaning of a communication.  By virtue of 
the way certain web forms operate, some search terms and other 
information that a user wishes to remain private can be incorporated into a 
URL.27  For example, a search of an online drug store for “Prozac” could 
generate a page of search results identified by a URL that contains the 
search term “Prozac.”  Hence, claims could be brought under the Wiretap 
Act when a keystroke monitor or software for contextual advertising 
acquires URLs and search terms.   
 
[12] Another electronic surveillance law that has been used to combat 
spyware is the Stored Communications Act (SCA).28  The SCA prohibits 
gaining unauthorized access to a "facility through which an electronic 
communication service is provided," and thereby "obtains, alters, or 
prevents authorized access to a wire or electronic communication while it 
is in electronic storage in such system . . . ."29  The SCA has been used by 
plaintiffs to challenge a third party’s use of cookies.30  In In re 
DoubleClick, although the court ultimately disposed of the claim on 
another issue, the plaintiffs challenged the third-party advertiser’s use of 
cookies under the premise that the “facilities” which the third party 
accessed were the plaintiffs’ computers.31   
 
[13] However, because the Wiretap Act and the SCA contain consent 
exceptions, which can be very liberally construed by courts, these acts 
cannot be relied upon to prevent spyware installation. Section 2511(2)(d) 
of the Wiretap Act provides: 
 
It shall not be unlawful under this chapter for a person not 
acting under color of law to intercept a wire, oral, or 
electronic communication where such person is a party to 
the communication or where one of the parties to the 
                                                 
26 Id. at § 2510(4). 
27 Patricia L. Bellia, Spyware and the Limits of Surveillance Law, 20 BERKELEY TECH. 
L.J. 1283, 1311 (Summer 2005). 
28 18 U.S.C. §2701(a) (2000). 
29 Id. at §2701(a)(2). 
30 In re Doubleclick, Inc., 154 F. Supp. 2d 497 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). 
31 Id. at 509. 
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communication has given prior consent to such interception 
unless such communication is intercepted for the purpose 
of committing any criminal or tortious act in violation of 
the Constitution or laws of the United States or of any 
State.32   
 
Similarly, under the SCA, a defendant's access to a protected facility is not 
prohibited unless "access without authorization" or exceeding authorized 
access is shown.33  The SCA contains an exception for conduct undertaken 
with the consent of a "user [of an electronic communication service] with 
respect to a communication of or intended for that user."34 
1. CONSENT AND “I AGREE” BUTTONS 
 
[14] Spyware bundled with a program that a computer user willingly 
downloads almost always obtains "consent" via an “I agree” button 
somewhere during the installation procedure, and usually in some hidden 
manner.  For example, Kazaa, a free peer-to-peer file-sharing application 
commonly used to exchange MP3 music files, is bundled with adware that 
generates revenue for the company.35  An unsuspecting user who has not 
carefully read the terms of Kazaa’s licensing agreement or who does not 
understand the terms of the agreement can unwittingly agree to 
interceptions under the Wiretap Act by clicking an “I Agree” button.  
Thus, the first major issue that arises when addressing the consent 
exceptions in the Wiretap Act and the SCA in the spyware context is 
whether clicking an “I Agree” button, displayed in connection with a 
license agreement detailing the capabilities of software, would constitute 
consent to the installation of spyware under the acts.   
 
[15] In the e-commerce realm, courts are willing to construe the clicking 
of an “I Agree” button as consent whether or not meaningful consent was 
actually present, and whether or not the user even saw the terms to begin 
with.  In I.Lan Systems, Inc. v. NetScout Service Level Corp., the court 
                                                 
32 18 U.S.C. §2511(2)(d) (2000). 
33 18 U.S.C. §2701(a) (2000).  
34 18 U.S.C. §2701(c) (2000). 
35 John Borland, Spike in "Spyware" Accelerates Arms Race, CNET NEWS.COM, Feb. 24, 
2003, http://news.com.com/2009-1023-985524.html?tag=cd_mh (describing the 
expansion of spyware and efforts to combat it). 
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enforced a license where the terms of the license appeared on screen prior 
to software installation and the defendant checked an "I Agree" box.36  
Similarly, in Forrest v. Verizon Commications, Inc., the court enforced a 
forum selection clause where terms were displayed in a scroll box and the 
plaintiff subscriber clicked the "Accept" button.37   In Caspi v. Microsoft 
Network, L.L.C., the court enforced a forum selection clause contained in 
an agreement with an ISP, even though the prospective subscriber could 
only access the service by clicking "I Agree."38  
 
[16] Thus, because courts have been willing to interpret the mere click of 
an “I accept” button as consent, even if meaningful consent was in fact 
absent, it is likely that courts would consider users who click an “I agree” 
button to have consented to the hidden terms included in bundled software 
license agreements.  Therefore, the SCA and the Wiretap Act cannot 
effectively battle the spyware problem. 
2. THIRD PARTY CONSENT 
 
[17] The second major issue that arises when addressing the consent 
exceptions in the Wiretap Act and the SCA is whether defendants can 
argue that a third-party advertiser consented to the interception at issue.  
For example, In re Pharmatrak Inc. Privacy Litigation involved a service 
provided to pharmaceutical companies by Pharmatrak. 39   Pharmatrak 
collected website traffic and aggregate usage information for these 
pharmaceutical companies’ websites, but promised the companies that it 
would not expose them to liability by collecting personal data from 
customers.40  However, Pharmatrak inadvertently collected personal 
information from customers, apparently as a result of two of the 
subscribing companies changing the method they used to retrieve the 
information from Pharmatrak.41  When a group of plaintiffs alleged that 
Pharmatrak had violated the Wiretap Act, Pharmatrak asserted that, 
because the customers provided their information to Pharmatrak’s client 
pharmacies, the pharmacies were parties to the communications and 
                                                 
36 I.Lan Sys., Inc. v. NetScout Serv. Level Corp., 183 F. Supp. 2d 328 (D. Mass. 2002). 
37 Forrest v. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc., 805 A.2d 1007 (D.C. 2002). 
38 Caspi v. Microsoft Network, L.L.C., 732 A.2d 528 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1999). 
39 In re Pharmatrak Inc., 329 F.3d 9 (1st Cir. 2003).  
40 Id. at 17. 
41 Id. at 15-16. 
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consented to the use of Pharmatrak's system.42  However, the First Circuit 
rejected the consent argument because, although the pharmaceutical 
companies had in general terms consented to the use of Pharmatrak's 
proposed system for gathering data on customers, the companies never 
agreed to the gathering of personally identifiable information.43  
Nevertheless, under a different set of factual circumstances – perhaps a 
case in which a website’s privacy statement contained buried text 
explaining that personally identifiable information would be collected – a 
defendant could easily argue that the third-party advertiser consented to 
the interception.   
 
[18] In summary, because courts appear willing to apply the consent 
exceptions to careless clicks of “I agree” buttons and third-party consent, 
surveillance laws are weak weapons against spyware.44 
B. THE COMPUTER FRAUD AND ABUSE ACT AND TRESPASS TO CHATTELS 
 
[19] The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA) and the common law 
claim of trespass to chattels are two other methods of potentially 
                                                 
42 Id. at 19. 
43 Id. at 20. 
44 Along with notice and consent issues, there are some other problems with using the 
Wiretap Act and the SCA to combat spyware. The Wiretap Act requires that a 
communication be “intercepted.”  Some types of spyware, such as keystroke monitors, 
capture data only within a single computer system, e.g. between the keyboard and the 
CPU. Two courts considering the issue of whether acquiring data within a single system 
can constitute an interception of an electronic communication, and more specifically 
addressing the issue of keystroke monitors under the Wiretap Act, have held that if a 
device or program captures a communication at a point where the communication is still 
internal to the user’s system, then no interception occurs. United States v. Scarfo, 180 F. 
Supp. 2d 572 (D.N.J. 2001); United States v. Ropp, 347 F. Supp. 2d 831 (C.D. Cal. 
2004). See also Bellia , supra note 27, at 1311.  In addition, data collected by spyware 
may not be considered the “contents” of a communication.  Under the Wiretap Act, 
“contents” include the “substance, purport, or meaning” of a communication.” 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2510(8) (2000).  Thus, a defendant could argue that when keystroke monitors or adware 
collects URLs and search terms, the communications do not constitute “contents” of a 
communication. With respect to the SCA, as one commentator has noted, even if a court 
were to accept the proposition that a user’s hard drive can be considered a facility, the 
hard drive does not provide and “electronic communications service.” Even if a court 
treats “internet access” as the relevant electronic communications service, then the user’s 
hard drive is not a “facility” through which internet access is provided. Id. at 1334. 
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combating spyware.  The CFAA was originally enacted to prosecute 
computer crimes of federal interest,45 but was amended in 1994 to provide 
for a private right of action.46  A private right of action is available (1) 
where there is loss to one or more persons aggregating $ 5,000 in any one 
year period; (2) where there has been - or there is a potential for - an 
impairment or modification of any medical treatment, diagnosis, 
examination, or care; (3) where there has been physical injury; (4) where 
there is a threat to public health or safety; or (5) where there is damage 
affecting a computer system used by or for a government entity in 
furtherance of the administration of justice, national defense, or national 
security.47 
 
[20] Consumers can also combat spyware under the common law claim of 
trespass to chattels.  According to the Restatement of Torts, "[a] trespass 
to a chattel may be committed by intentionally . . . using or intermeddling 
with a chattel in the possession of another,"48 where "the chattel is 
impaired as to its condition, quality, or value . . . ."49  One of the most 
commonly cited cases involving trespass to chattels in cyberspace is eBay, 
Inc. v. Bidder's Edge, Inc.50  In this case, eBay sued a competitor who 
inundated its site with "robots," or computer programs designed to 
constantly query the eBay site for auction information.  Bidder’s Edge 
used robots to collect information from eBay and other auction sites, and 
then consolidated the information on its own site.51 The court granted a 
preliminary injunction on the trespass claim because it found that the 
denial of an injunction would encourage other companies to mimic 
Bidder's Edge, thereby overloading eBay's systems.52  
1. AFTER-THE-FACT SOLUTIONS 
 
[21] Unfortunately, the CFAA and the common law claim of trespass to 
chattels also prove to be incomplete solutions to the spyware problem.  
                                                 
45 S. REP. NO. 99-432, at 4 (1986), as reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2479, 2482. 
46 18 U.S.C. § 1030(g) (2000). 
47 Id. at §1030(a)(5)(B)(i)-(v). 
48 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 217(b) (1965). 
49 Id. § 218(b). 
50 eBay, Inc. v. Bidder's Edge, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 2d 1058 (N.D. Cal. 2000). 
51 Id. at 1060-63. 
52 Id. at 1072. 
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The main problem with these solutions is that they are merely after-the-
fact solutions.  They do not require software purveyors to provide any 
specific kind of notice to begin with, or require companies to make their 
spyware easy to control or remove.  Thus, like the Wiretap Act and the 
SCA, these solutions cannot effectively combat spyware because they do 
not allow consumers to have a meaningful say in what software can be 
legally installed on their computers and, hence, cannot prevent the damage 
caused by spyware. 
 
2. DAMAGE THRESHOLDS 
 
[22] Furthermore, the damage thresholds of the CFAA and the trespass to 
chattels claims also render these solutions ineffective to combat spyware.  
These damage requirements allow courts to decide how undesirable or 
harmful a given piece of software is, rather than letting consumers decide 
for themselves what software can legally be installed on their computers. 
 
[23] As mentioned previously, if an individual wanted to bring an action 
against a spyware company under the CFAA, they would most likely have 
to prove a loss of $5,000 in a year.53  Courts differ widely in their 
interpretation of the $5,000 damage requirement.  Some courts have held 
that claims may be aggregated among multiple plaintiffs to fulfill the 
$5,000 loss in one year requirement,54 while others require that the $5,000 
loss must be inflicted on a single computer.55  For example, in In re 
DoubleClick, the court held that because DoubleClick’s collection of data 
through cookies had not caused $5,000 in damage to a single computer, 
the CFAA did not apply.56  The court found that the damages could only 
be aggregated “over victims and time for a single act.”57  By contrast, in In 
re Toys R Us, Inc., the court found that the placement of cookies on 
consumers’ computers could constitute a single act and that damages 
could be aggregated across the class.58   
                                                 
53 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(5)(b)(i) (2000). 
54 See, e.g., In re DoubleClick Inc., 154 Supp. 2d at 524. 
55 See, e.g., In re Am. Online, Inc. Version 5.0 Software Litig., 168 F. Supp. 2d 1359, 
1374 (S.D. Fla. 2001); In re Toys R Us, Inc. Privacy Litig., No. 00-CV-2746, 2001 WL 
34517252 (N.D. Cal. 2001). 
56 154 F. Supp. 2d at 524. 
57 Id. 
58 Toys R Us, 2001 WL 34517252, at *11. 
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[24] There is a similar damage threshold implied in the common law claim 
of trespass to chattels.  If a court finds that damage caused by trespass is 
not serious enough, a consumer attempting to use this common law claim 
to punish a violation is out of luck.  Ticketmaster Corp. v. Tickets.com, 
Inc. provides one example of a trespass to chattels claim in the e-
commerce realm failing because a court did not find that enough damage 
had been caused.59  In Ticketmaster, Tickets.com, a direct competitor to 
Ticketmaster, provided event information to the public via its website.60  
Tickets.com used spiders to search and copy information from 
Ticketmaster’s site, and then provided unauthorized deep links to 
Ticketmaster’s site, allowing visitors to access information on its site and 
bypass its main page and associated advertising.61 Ticketmaster brought 
suit alleging, among other things, trespass to chattels from Tickets.com.62  
In evaluating the trespass claim, the Ticketmaster court denied the 
injunction because of insufficient proof of trespass and irreparable 
injury.63  The court stated:  
 
A basic element of trespass to chattels must be physical 
harm to the chattel (not present here) or some obstruction 
of its basic function (in the court's opinion not sufficiently 
shown here). TM has presented statistics showing an 
estimate of the number of hits by T.Com spiders in its own 
computers and has presented rough comparisons with the 
total use of the computers by all users of the computers. 
The comparative use by T.Com appears very small and 
there is no showing that the use interferes to any extent 
with the regular business of TM.64 
                                                 
59 Ticketmaster Corp. v. Tickets.com, Inc., No. 99CV7654, 2000 WL 1887522 (C.D. Cal. 
2000). 
60 Id. at *1. 
61 Id. at *2. 
62 Id. at *3. 
63 Id. at *4. 
64 Id. 
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IV. KEY ELEMENTS OF NATIONAL SPYWARE LEGISLATION:  NOTICE, 
CONSENT, REMOVAL REQUIREMENTS 
A. THE INADEQUACIES OF CURRENT LEGISLATION 
 
[25] As detailed above, if one surveys current legislation, it becomes 
apparent that the major weakness in the existing body of law is that 
software purveyors are not required to give consumers meaningful notice 
and consent before installing potentially damaging software.  Current laws 
make it too easy for a consumer to “consent” to spyware without ever 
realizing that spyware is being loaded onto the consumer’s computer. 
B. THE NATURE OF SPYWARE 
 
[26] The nature of spyware bolsters the proposition that meaningful notice 
and consent requirements are the key to effective legislation.   
1. “SPYWARE” IS HARD TO DEFINE 
 
[27] “Spyware” means different things to different people.  What one 
person views as harmful software another person may view as helpful.  
Although many extreme types of spyware may be universally viewed as 
“bad software” in the eyes of the computer user (i.e. software that secretly 
installs itself onto a computer to steal personal information to be used for 
identity theft), other types of software may be viewed as desirable by 
some individuals and not desirable by others.  For example, SideStep is a 
program that informs a user who has purchased a plane ticket whether 
better deals on the same trip are available with other airlines.  However, 
potentially useful programs such as SideStep track what users see and 
what users' preferences are.  These programs also have extensive 
information about users' offline activities.65  While some users might view 
this as intrusive software and wish to prevent it from installing itself onto 
their computers, others would welcome its installation.  Thus, spyware 
legislation that is anchored in notice and consent requirements will allow 
users to define for themselves what constitutes unwelcome spyware.   
                                                 
65 See Megan Johnston, Struggling Upstream, FORBES, November 14, 2005, at 100. 
Richmond Journal of Law & Technology Volume XIII, Issue1 
 
14 
2. CHANGING TECHNOLOGY 
 
[28] Spyware technology is constantly advancing, causing legislation that 
is too specific (e.g. “bad acts” legislation) to become quickly outdated.  
Therefore, more flexible legislation is necessary.  As one commentator has 
noted, “The fact is that laws for controlling inappropriate and unethical 
uses of technology are always framed after the problem has mutated into 
wildly different forms and the issues are rarely understood by the 
lawmakers who sign them off anyway.”66  Decisions about what kinds of 
software should be installed on consumers’ computers should not be left in 
the hands of legislators.  Notice and consent requirements would force 
software purveyors to explain which functions each new piece of software 
performs and allow users to make case-by-case decisions on which types 
of novel software to allow onto their computers as technology progresses.  
In addition, flexible legislation rooted in consumer consent would also 
avoid stifling innovation.  
V. DOES PENDING SPYWARE LEGISLATION FIT THE BILL? 
 
[29] The best way to combat spyware is to anchor spyware legislation in 
meaningful user notice and consent.  This section explores currently 
pending spyware legislation and, more specifically, the notice and consent 
provisions included in the legislation. 
A. I-SPY AND SPY ACT 
 
[30] The Securely Protect Yourself Against Cyber Trespass Act ("SPY 
ACT"), which was introduced by Representative Mary Bono during the 
109th Congress and passed in the House on May 23, 2005, is a complex 
and comprehensive proposal to fight spyware.  The SPY ACT outlaws 
many of the functions currently performed by spyware, for example 
“delivering advertisements that a user of the computer cannot close . . . ”67 
and “modifying . . . security or other settings of the computer that protect 
information about the owner or authorized user for the purposes of causing 
                                                 
66 Mark Gibbs , Banning the Licking of Toads, NETWORK WORLD, Oct. 11, 2004, at 62. 
67 Securely Protect Yourself Against Cyber Trespass (SPY) Act, H.R. 29, 109th Cong. at 
2(a)(1)(E) (2005). 
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damage or harm to the computer or owner or user.”68  In this regard, it is 
similar to the state “bad acts” bills.  
 
[31] The Internet Spyware Prevention Act of 2005 (I-SPY) is the criminal 
component of the SPY ACT/I-SPY package.  In contrast to the regulatory 
framework of the SPY ACT, I-SPY combats spyware by imposing 
penalties for actual harm to computers.69  I-SPY focuses on protecting 
personal information and safeguarding consumers from spyware that 
attacks security protection that is already in place on computers.70  Under 
I-SPY, anyone who uses spyware to intentionally break into a computer 
and either alter the computer's security settings, obtain personal 
information with the intent to defraud or injure a person, or with the intent 
to damage a computer, faces up to a two-year prison sentence.  Those who 
use software to intentionally break into a computer and then uses that 
software in furtherance of another federal crime face the same penalty.71   
 
[32] Although I-SPY focuses on penalties after the fact and does not 
contain notice and consent provisions, the SPY ACT includes a notice 
requirement for software downloads containing spyware that collects 
information.72  The notice provisions in the SPY ACT require “clear and 
                                                 
68 Id. § 2(a)(2)(D). 
69 Crawford, supra note 6, at 1448. 
70 Internet Spyware Prevention (I-SPY) Act, H.R. 744, 109th Cong. at 2 (2005). 
71 Id.  § 1030A 
72 SPY ACT, H.R. 29, at 3: 
SEC. 3. PROHIBITION OF COLLECTION OF CERTAIN INFORMATION 
WITHOUT NOTICE AND CONSENT. 
(a) Opt-in Requirement. Except as provided in subsection (e), it is 
unlawful for any person— 
(1) to transmit to a protected computer, which is not owned by such 
person and for which such person is not an authorized user, any 
information collection program, unless-- 
(A) such information collection program provides notice in 
accordance with subsection (c) before execution of any of the 
information collection functions of the program; and 
(B) such information collection program includes the 
functions required under subsection (d); or 
(2) to execute any information collection program installed on such a 
protected computer unless-- 
(A) before execution of any of the information collection functions of 
the program, the owner or an authorized user of the protected computer 
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conspicuous notice in plain language,” that notice be clearly distinguished 
from any other information presented at the same time on the computer, 
and that notice contain particular required texts in English, with three 
possibilities depending on the type of software: 
 
(1) [T]his program will collect and transmit information 
about you. Do you accept? 
 
(2) [T]his program will collect information about Web 
pages you access and will use that information to display 
advertising on your computer. Do you accept? 
 
(3) [T]his program will collect and transmit information 
about you and will collect information about Web pages 
you access and use that to display advertising on your 
computer. Do you accept? 73  
 
In addition, before accepting the consumer must be able to see exactly 
what type of information is being collected and the purpose for which such 
information is to be collected and sent.74   
 
[33] Information collecting programs must also be fitted with a disabling 
function that “is easily identifiable to a user of the computer” and “can be 
performed without undue effort or knowledge by the user of the protected 
computer.”75  With regard to the removal requirements, the SPY ACT 
provides that programs must be easily removable by the consumer, and a 
clear delineation between which "pop-up" advertising is caused by which 
spyware program so that consumers can easily remove unwanted pop-up 
generating software.76    
 
 
 
                                                                                                                         
has consented to such execution pursuant to notice in accordance with 
subsection (c) . . . . 
73 Id. § 3(c)(1)(B)(i)-(iii). 
74 Id. § 3(c)(1)(D). 
75 Id. § 43(a)(1)(A)-(B). 
76 Id. § 3(d)(1). 
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B. SPY BLOCK 
 
[34] The Senate is considering the Software Principles Yielding Better 
Levels of Consumer Knowledge Act (“SPY BLOCK” Act).77  The SPY 
BLOCK Act is in part a “bad acts” bill, but also contains many notice and 
consent provisions.  Under SPY BLOCK, it is unlawful for “any person 
who is not the user of a protected computer to install computer software 
on that computer, or to authorize, permit, or cause the installation of 
computer software on that computer,” unless notice is provided.  Notice 
must: 
 
(1) include a clear notification, displayed on the screen 
until the user either grants or denies consent to installation, 
of the name and general nature of the computer software 
that will be installed if the user grants consent; and 
 
(2) include a separate disclosure, with respect to each 
information collection, advertising, distributed computing, 
and settings modification feature contained in the computer 
software, that 
 
(A) remains displayed on the screen until the user 
either grants or denies consent to that feature.78 
 
[35] Furthermore, depending on the software’s functions, different types 
of notice must be provided before installation.  If the software contains an 
information collection feature, then notice must describe: (1) the type of 
personal or network information to be collected and transmitted by the 
computer software; and (2) the purpose for which the personal or network 
information is to be collected, transmitted, and used.79  If the software 
contains pop-up ad features, then notice must provide: 
 
(i) a representative example of the type of advertisement 
that may be delivered by the computer software; 
 
                                                 
77 Supra note 5.  
78 Id. § 3(a). 
79 Id. § 3(a)(2)(B). 
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 (ii) a clear description of— 
 
(I) the estimated frequency with which each type of 
advertisement may be delivered; or 
 
(II) the factors on which the frequency will depend; 
and 
 
(iii) a clear description of how the user can distinguish each 
type of advertisement that the computer software delivers 
from advertisements generated by other software, Internet 
website operators, or service.80 
 
If the software contains a distributed computing feature,81 then notice must 
describe: 
 
(i) the types of information or messages the computer 
software will cause the computer to transmit; 
 
(ii) (I) the estimated frequency with which the computer 
software will cause the computer to transmit such messages 
or information; or (II) the factors on which the frequency 
will depend; 
 
(iii) the estimated volume of such information or messages, 
and the likely impact, if any, on the processing or 
communications capacity of the user's computer; and 
  
 (iv) the nature, volume, and likely impact on the 
computer's processing capacity of any computational or 
processing tasks the computer software will cause the 
computer to perform in order to generate the information or 
                                                 
80 Id. § 3(a)(2)(C).  
81 The term "distributed computing feature" means a function of computer software that, 
when installed on a computer, transmits information or messages, other than personal or 
network information about the user of the computer, to any other computer without the 
knowledge or direction of the user and for purposes unrelated to the tasks or functions the 
user intentionally performs using the computer. Id. § 8(7).  
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messages the computer software will cause the computer to 
transmit.82 
 
[36] If the software contains a settings modification feature, then notice 
must provide “a clear description of the nature of the modification, its 
function, and any collateral effects the modification may produce.”83 In 
addition, like the SPY ACT, under SPY BLOCK software must offer an 
uninstall function, and software purveyors must provide “a clear 
description of procedures the user may follow to turn off such feature or 
uninstall the computer software.”84   
VI. SUGGESTED IMPROVEMENTS 
 
[37] The SPY ACT/I-SPY and SPY BLOCK Acts could prove to be very 
effective in the fight against spyware.  Many provisions address the major 
shortfalls of current state laws being used to battle spyware.  Most notably, 
the acts focus on the importance of providing computer users with notice 
and requiring that software purveyors obtain meaningful consent.  Unlike 
the Wiretap Act and the SCA, the proposed legislation requires clear and 
conspicuous notice provisions, which ensure that computer users cannot 
accidentally click away their rights when notice of a piece of spyware’s 
capabilities are buried within the terms of the license agreement.  In 
addition, unlike the Wiretap Act and the SCA, potential defendants cannot 
hide behind a third party’s alleged consent in order to escape liability for 
installing potentially harmful software.  Because the proposed acts focus 
on clear and conspicuous notice and consent provisions they can also 
prevent damage before it happens, unlike the after-the-fact solutions 
provided by the CFAA and trespass to chattels claims.  Furthermore, 
consent can, in effect, be revoked under these proposed acts because they 
require that software be fitted with removal capabilities.   
 
[38] There are, however, a few major weaknesses in the notice and 
consent provisions of the proposed acts.  The next section suggests how 
these acts can be tweaked to remedy their shortcomings. 
                                                 
82 Id. § 3(a)(2)(D).  
83 SPY BLOCK, supra note 5 at § 3(a)(2)(E). 
84 Id. § 3(a)(2)(F).   
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A. RIGID DEFINITIONS 
 
[39] The notice provisions in both the SPY ACT and SPY BLOCK are 
written to apply to very specific types of technology.  Very specific 
wording does make what is required of software purveyors clear, but (1) 
these provisions may allow certain types of software that a consumer may 
find undesirable to slip through the cracks; and (2), these provisions can 
become quickly outdated as technology progresses.   
 
[40] The main problem with the notice and consent provisions found in the 
SPY ACT is that these provisions only apply to software programs falling 
under the Act’s definition of “information collection program.”85  Thus, 
other software that consumers may find undesirable can still be installed 
without any notice or consent.  For example, some political data-mining 
companies collect and share aggregated, non-personally identifiable 
information with campaigns.86  Many of these companies build their 
political databases by providing free e-mail services and requiring 
subscribers to fill out questionnaires.87  Initial questionnaires collect the 
demographics of database members, such as age, gender, income, 
                                                 
85 Id. § 3(b)(1):   
(b) Information Collection Program. 
(1) In general. For purposes of this section, the term "information 
collection program" means computer software that performs either of 
the following functions: 
(A) Collection of personally identifiable information. The 
computer software-- 
(i) collects personally identifiable information; and 
(ii)(I) sends such information to a person other than 
the owner or authorized user of the computer, or (II) 
uses such information to deliver advertising to, or 
display advertising on, the computer. 
(B) Collection of information regarding web pages visited to 
deliver advertising. The computer software-- 
(i) collects information regarding the Web pages 
accessed using the computer; and 
(ii) uses such information to deliver advertising to, or 
display advertising on, the computer. 
 
86 See Philip N. Howard, Deep Democracy, Thin Citizenship: The Impact of Digital 
Media in Political Campaign Strategy, 597 ANNALS 153, 164-165 (2005). 
87 Id. § 165. 
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expected major purchases, hobbies, interests, family size, and education.88  
Because these companies may only collect and share aggregated 
information, as opposed to personally identifiable information, their 
software would be immune from the notice and consent provisions of the 
SPY ACT.  Consumers who may not want this software on their computer, 
because it could slow down their computer or because they do not want 
their data to be collected even not personally identifiable, would not have 
proper notice of the software’s functions.  In addition, because the 
definition of “information collection program” is so specific, software 
developers could create spyware that falls outside the definition in order to 
avoid these notice and consent requirements.   
 
[41] Similarly, SPY BLOCK’s notice provisions, which call for specific 
types of notice depending on whether software has information collection 
features, pop-up ad features, distributed computing features, or settings 
modification features, can quickly become outdated as technology outside 
these four functionality categories is developed.  
B. UNDEFINED CONSENT 
 
[42] Furthermore, neither the SPY ACT nor SPY BLOCK contains a clear 
description of what constitutes consent.  The SPY ACT does not define 
what qualifies as consent, and SPY BLOCK merely states: 
 
(b) Consent. For purposes of section 2(a)(2), consent 
requires— 
 
(1) consent by the user of the computer to the 
installation of the computer software; and 
 
(2) separate affirmative consent by the user of the 
computer to each information collection feature, 
advertising feature, distributed computing feature, 
and settings modification feature contained in the 
computer software.89  
 
                                                 
88 Id. 
89 SPY BLOCK, supra note 5, at §3(b). 
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“Consent” is therefore left open to interpretation.  Has a person who 
clicked an “I agree” button after reading notice which was conspicuous 
but written in a confusing or misleading manner consented?  Under the 
acts, the answer could possibly be ‘yes.’  
C. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS 
 
[43] Unlike the SPY ACT, ideal spyware legislation would contain notice 
and consent provisions which apply to all software that will potentially be 
installed onto a computer,90 not just software that falls under a specific 
                                                 
90 See SPY ACT, supra note 3, at 3(b)(2) (exceptions outlined in the SPY ACT and SPY 
BLOCK should still be honored in order to avoid overwhelming the computer user with 
unnecessary warnings: 
      (2) Exception for software collecting information regarding 
      web pages visited within a particular Web site. Computer software that 
      otherwise would be considered an information collection program by 
      reason of paragraph (1)(B) shall not be considered such a program if-- 
 (A) the only information collected by the software regarding Web pages 
that are accessed using the computer is information regarding Web pages 
within a particular Web site; 
 (B) such information collected is not sent to a person other than-- 
   (i) the provider of the Web site accessed; or 
   (ii) a party authorized to facilitate the display or functionality of 
Web pages within the Web site accessed; and 
  (C) the only advertising delivered to or displayed on the computer using 
such information is advertising on Web pages within that particular Web 
site. 
See also SPY ACT, supra note 3, at 5(b): 
(b) Exception Relating to Security. Nothing in this Act shall apply to-- 
       (1) any monitoring of, or interaction with, a subscriber's 
       Internet or other network connection or service, or a protected 
      computer, by a telecommunications carrier, cable operator, computer 
       hardware or software provider, or provider of information service or 
       interactive computer service, to the extent that such monitoring or 
       interaction is for network or computer security purposes, diagnostics, 
       technical support, or repair, or for the detection or prevention of 
       fraudulent activities; or 
       (2) a discrete interaction with a protected computer by a 
       provider of computer software solely to determine whether the user of 
       the computer is authorized to use such software . . . . 
See also SPY BLOCK, supra note 5, at 5: 
SEC. 5. EXCEPTIONS. 
 (a) Preinstalled Software… 
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definition which may become outdated.  In addition, rather than providing 
specific notice requirements for discrete categories of spyware as SPY 
BLOCK does, ideal national spyware legislation would provide detailed 
yet flexible notice requirements applicable to all types of software, even as 
technology progresses.   
 
[44] For example, in order to ensure notice is adequately conveyed to a 
consumer, legislation could include a list of factors that must be met in 
order for notice to be considered “clear and conspicuous.”  The FTC has 
defined “clear and conspicuous” in its business guide for online 
advertising, "Dot Com Disclosures: Information About Online 
Advertising.”91  The factors detailed in this guide could be borrowed and 
integrated into the spyware legislation. This would cause spyware 
purveyors to pay particular attention to: (1) the placement of the required 
disclosure and its proximity to the “I agree” button or other consent 
method; (2) the prominence of the required disclosure; (3) the presence of 
distracting features; (4) the need for the repetition of the required 
disclosure due to the length of the notice; (5) the adequacy of volume, 
cadence and duration of any audio disclosure; and (6) the 
understandability of the language of the disclosure.92  These factors could 
rein in courts which, as detailed above in Part III, appear to vary widely in 
their understanding of “clear and conspicuous” in the e-commerce realm. 
 
                                                                                                                         
 (b) Other Exceptions. Sections 3(a)(2), 3(b)(2), and 4 do not apply to 
any feature of computer software that is reasonably needed to –  
        (1) provide capability for general purpose online browsing, 
        electronic mail, or instant messaging, or for any optional function 
        that is directly related to such capability and that the user 
        knowingly chooses to use; 
        (2) determine whether or not the user of the computer is 
       licensed or authorized to use the computer software; and 
        (3) provide technical support for the use of the computer 
        software by the user of the computer. 
  (c) Passive Transmission, Hosting, or Link . . .  
(d) Software Resident in Temporary Memory . . .  
  (e) Features Activated by User Options… 
91 BUREAU OF CONSUMER PROTECTION, FED. TRADE COMM’N, DOT.COM DISCLOSURES: 
INFORMATION ABOUT ONLINE ADVERTISING, available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/conline/pubs/buspubs/dotcom/index.html. 
92 See id. at 5-6. 
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[45] In order to define the flexible parameters for notice, spyware 
legislators could also borrow from other fields.  In the realm of legal 
ethics, Model Rule 1.0(e) defines "informed consent" as "the agreement by 
a person to a proposed course of conduct after the lawyer has 
communicated adequate information and explanation about the material 
risks of and reasonably available alternatives to the proposed course of 
conduct."93  The Restatement (Second) of Agency 376 defines consent as 
"[t]he existence and extent of the duties of the agent to the principal are 
determined by the terms of the agreement between the parties, interpreted 
in light of the circumstances under which it is made, except to the extent 
that fraud, duress, illegality, or the incapacity of one or both of the parties 
to the agreement modifies it or deprives it of legal effect."94  In the torts 
realm, for medical negligence to constitute malpractice a successful suit 
will depend on the plaintiff's ability to demonstrate five key elements: (1) 
the physician's duty owed to the patient to provide information; (2) breach 
of the physician's duty; (3) harm suffered by the patient; (4) the relation of 
the harm to the development of an undisclosed risk; and (5) evidence that 
had the patient been informed of the risk, he or she would not have 
consented to the procedure.95  
 
[46] Borrowing from these elements, national legislation could require 
notice to include: (1) adequate information about what functions the 
software performs; and (2) material risks of the software, e.g., will it share 
personal information or change or disable the functionality of a user's 
machine as set by the user.  Deceit should violate consent.  In addition, in 
examining informed consent courts could consider the harm suffered by 
the user, and the relation of that harm to the development of an 
undisclosed risk.   
 
[47] Further, if there is a question as to whether it is reasonable to expect a 
consumer has read and understood the terms of an agreement, survey 
evidence could be utilized.  With respect to advertising, the FTC’s Policy 
Statement on Deception states that an advertisement is deceptive where 
there is “a misrepresentation, omission or other practice that misleads the 
                                                 
93 Model Rules of Conduct 1.0(e). 
94 Restatement of (Second) Agency 376. 
95 RUTH R. FADEN & TOM L. BEAUCHAMP, A HISTORY AND THEORY OF INFORMED 
CONSENT 23-49 (1986). 
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consumer acting reasonably in the circumstances, to the consumer’s 
detriment.”96  In order to determine what a “consumer acting reasonably in 
the circumstances” would do, the FTC has increasingly used consumer 
surveys and such objective evidence as proof of the likeliness to mislead 
in advertising.97  In addition, courts frequently adopt surveys to determine 
consumers’ perceptions in trademark infringement cases brought under the 
Lanham act.98  In order to ensure software purveyors obtain meaningful 
user consent before installing software onto a computer, legislation could 
require that if there is a question as to whether a reasonable consumer 
would be able to read and understand notice provisions, both plaintiff and 
defendant may present survey evidence. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
 
[48] National spyware legislation is necessary because the only current 
legislation specifically addressing the problem exists on a state level.  
State spyware legislation, which varies from state to state, leads to 
significant business planning and litigation costs.99  In addition, the ability 
of one state to set policy for the whole country via state spyware 
legislation triggers Dormant Commerce Clause issues.100  Because of these 
factors, spyware must be combated at the national level. 
 
[49] While spyware can be challenged under laws which were not 
specifically enacted to address the spyware problem, namely the Wiretap 
Act, the Stored Communications Act, the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 
and the common law claim of trespass to chattels, these laws are 
inadequate to combat the problem because they do not allow consumers to 
have a meaningful say in what software can be legally installed on their 
                                                 
 
96 FTC POLICY STATEMENT ON DECEPTION, available at  http://www3.ftc.gov/bcp/ 
policystmt/ad-decept.htm (1983). 
97 See, e.g., Kraft, Inc. v. F.T.C., 970 F.2d 311 (7th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 909 
(1993); In re Thompson Medical Co., Inc., 104 F.T.C. 648 (1984); Stouffer Foods Corp., 
5 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 23,686 (1994). 
98 Peter H. Huang, Moody Investing and the Supreme Court: Rethinking the Materiality 
of Information and the Reasonableness of Investors, 13 S. CT. ECON. REV. 99, 114 
(2005). 
99 Menell, supra note 21, at 1412. 
100 Crawford, supra note 6, at 1443. 
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computers.  The Wiretap Act and the Stored Communications Act have 
“consent exceptions” which can be so liberally construed by courts that 
consumers can unwittingly “consent” to the installation of spyware.  The 
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, and the common law claim of trespass to 
chattels, are problematic because they are after-the-fact solutions that 
cannot prevent problems to begin with. 
 
[50] National spyware legislation currently being proposed, i.e. the SPY 
ACT, I-SPY and SPY BLOCK, could be very effective in battling the 
spyware problem.  These bills contain detailed notice and consent 
provisions, and thus can avoid the problems posed in vague and loosely 
enforced consent provisions of the Wiretap Act and the SCA, and the 
nonexistent notice and consent provisions in the CFAA and the common 
law claim of trespass to chattels.  This legislation, grounded in notice and 
consent requirements, would provide for the flexibility needed to battle 
ever-changing spyware technology.   
 
[51] Although the proposed legislation is very promising, there are still a 
few areas that could be improved.  First, the notice and consent provisions 
of the SPY ACT and SPY BLOCK are written to apply to very specific 
types of technology, and thus some software that certain users may 
consider harmful would not be subject to these provisions.  Second, the 
limited application would prevent legislation from battling new forms of 
potentially harmful spyware.  Third, neither SPY ACT nor SPY BLOCK 
contain a clear description of what constitutes consent.  Because “consent” 
is left open to interpretation, even if computer users are given notice that is 
written in a confusing or misleading manner, courts may interpret consent 
to this type of notice to be “informed.”   
 
[52] In order to improve the currently proposed legislation, legislators 
could look to the FTC’s “clear and conspicuous” guidelines for internet 
advertising to shape spyware legislation’s notice requirements.  
Legislators could borrow elements of informed consent from other fields, 
and require that notice include adequate information about (1) what 
functions the software performs, and (2) material risks of the software.  In 
examining informed consent, courts could look at the harms suffered by 
the user and the relation of the harm to the development of an undisclosed 
risk.  Lastly, if there is a question about whether it is reasonable to expect 
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that a consumer has read and understood the terms of an agreement, 
survey evidence could be utilized.   
